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THE N EW  BRUNSWICK UNSATISFIED JUDGMENT 
FU N D /’
Franklin C). Leger¡
T h e time allotted for this talk precludes a full discussion of 
llic Unsatisfied Judgment Fund of this province;1 however, I 
propose setting out brieflv sonic of its major provisions.
T h e Unsatisfied Judgment Fund was first established in 
New Brunswick bv legislation in 1951,2 but it was not proclaimed 
until February, 1053. It is now_ provided for in sections 286-303 
of T h e  M otor V ehicle Act 1955.'’
Under section 286, a fee, not exceeding one dollar, is paid 
by every person to whom a licence or renewal is issued. These 
fees, called unsatisfied judgment fees, constitute a fund known 
as the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund. T h e payment of the fees may 
be suspended from time to time by the Lieutenant-Governor in 
Council having regard to the amount of the Fund.
Scope and Purpose of the Fund.
Recourse may be had to the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund 
where a person obtains in any court in New Brunswick a judg­
ment
<:i> against an owner of a motor vehicle or a driver of a motor 
\ehicle other than a motor vehicle owned by or under the care 
or control of the person, for damages for injuries to or the 
death of any person or damage to properly, arising out of the 
operation, care or control of the m otor vehicle in the Province: 
or
* I he following substantially reproduces a talk delivered as part of a sym­
posium arranged by the Faculty of l.aw of the University of New Brunswick 
at the Mid-winter Meeting of the New Brunswick Section of the Canadian 
Bar Association held at Fredericton, N. B., February 20 and 21. 19">9. 
{Franklin  O. Leger, B.A. (St. F .X .), B.C.L. (I .N.B.). is associated with 
Messrs. Feed. Palm er 8c O ’Connell. Saint John. N. B.
1. L ittle , for exam ple, will be said of actions against persons unknown.
2. (1951) 15 Ceo. V I, c. 22. s. 17.
3. (195») 4 F.liz. I I .  c. 13. Part V III.
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(l>) against a Party Unknown, as contemplated by section 293, 
for damages for injury to or the death of any person arising 
out of the operation, care or control of a motor vehicle in the 
Province.-»
By scction 1(29) of the M otor V chiclc Act 1955, “motor vehicle” 
is defined as “every vehicle which is self propelled and every 
vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from over­
head trolley wires, and not operated upon rails, but docs not 
include a farm tractor”; however, for the purposes of the Unsatis­
fied Judgment .provisions, “motor vehicle’ includes farm tractor.3
Judicial exposition of the purpose of an Unsatisfied Judg­
ment Fund is to be found in several reported cases. For example, 
when considering the Ontario legislation in Re MacBeth v. 
Curran?  Gale, J. of the Ontario High Court said:
Its language shows that it was passed to establish a government- 
sponsored benefit fund for the protection of certain unfortunate 
individuals who have suffered as the result of the operation of 
the m otor vehicles in Ontario. T he first requisite is that the 
person who sustains the loss is to obtain a judgm ent, and 
surely it is not the right of this (knirt or its duty to go behind 
the judgment on an application of this kind. T h is is beneficial 
legislation passed for the protection of the public and the 
c urt should take care to sec that the rights thereby created are 
not frittered away by narrow judicial interpretation. W hen the 
object of a statute is plainly for the advantage of the public 
the Court must strive to interpret the words in such a way as 
to accomplish the desired result.
In Telfer v. Kerr7 M cRuer, C .J.H .C . enlarged upon the principles 
expounded by Gale, J. saying:
W ith the principles there outlined I entirely agree, but there 
are other principles of a converse nature that I would add.
W hile this legislation is beneficial in character anti "the rights 
created are not t:> be frittered away by narrow judicial inter­
pretation”, it is at the same time to l>e remembered that the 
ob ject of the legislation is to relieve against hardship and not 
to provide a fund in the nature of a fiee reinsurance scheme 
for insurers of those who have suffered damage as the result 
of the operation of m ctor vehicles, or any means by which 
insured persons may be twice compensated for injuries sustain­
ed. As 1 indicated on the argument, this is a public fund set 
up by means of a levy on all licensed operators of autom o­
biles, and is to  be regarded as a sort o f Inst resort.8
4. T h e  Motor Y'ehicle Act 1955. s. 287. as enacted by (1958) 7 Eliz. I I ,
c. 19, s. 16.
5. T h e  M otor Vehicle Act 1955, s. 285 (c), as enacted by (1958) 7 Eliz. I I . 
c. 19, s. 15.
6. [1948] 3 D .L .R . 85, at pp. 87-8.
7. [1949] 2 D .L .R . 627.
8. Ibid ., at p. 629 (Italics mine).
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How broadly should the words “for damages for injuries to 
or the death of any person“,* which appear in section 287, be 
interpreted? T h e  Ontario Court of Appeal, in Klebanoff v. Price? 
held that similar words included damages recovered by a company 
for the loss of services of its president occasioned by injuries 
suffered by him in an automobile collision, since such damages 
were “011 account of injury to” the company officer. Similarly, in 
Re Brady v. Ferrill,U) it was held by Ferguson, J. of the Ontario 
High C ourt that recourse could be had to the Fund by a husband 
who had recovered damages for loss of consortium in an action 
arising from an automobile accident in which his wife was injured.
Procedure on Application
T h e procedure 011 application for payment out of the Fund 
underwent important changes by amendments to T h e  M otor 
V ehicle Act in 1958. Formerly, once a judgment was obtained 
and certain requirements met, the person applied in the first 
instance by way of motion to a Judge of the Supreme Court for 
an order for payment out of the Fund upon giving notice to the 
Provincial Sccrctary-Treasurer.11 By the former section 288,12 the 
Judge could make an order directed to the Provincial Secretary- 
Treasurer for payment out of the Fund, provided the require­
ments therein set out were satisfied. From  the applicant’s point of 
view, this procedure was not particularly cumbersome or imprac­
tical, but some of the requisites for the application could unneces­
sarily delay eventual payment from the Fund.
Under the 1958 amendments, the new procedure is briefly
as follows. Upon the determination of all proceedings, includ­
ing appeals, application is made to the Provincial Secretarv-Treas- 
urer (who is referred to as “the M inister”) for payment out of 
the Fund of the amounts in respect of the judgment to which 
the applicant is entitled.13
A new section 287A sets out the prerequisites for payment 
out of the Fund bv the M inister. It  provides that the person 
applying must make an affidavit setting out
(1) the amount he has recovered or is entitled to recover, from 
any source, for or in respect of anv injury, death or damage to 
person or property arising out of the operation, care or control
9. [1949] 2 D .I..R . '»7.'*.
10. [I9">4] 2 n .L .R . 2.'>3.
11. T h e  M otor Vehicle Act I9.Y», 4 F.liz. II . c. 13. s. 287.
12. Ib id ., s. 288.
13. T h e  Motor Vehicle Act 19V>. s. 287. un enacted l>\ (I9">8) 7 l’li/. II.
C. 19. s. 16.
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of the motor vehiclc by the owner or driver thereof against 
whom the judgment was obtained, whether or not in the 
action damages were claimed for or in respect of the injury, 
death or damage, and also any compensation or services or Den- 
cfits with a pecuniary value he has recovered or received or is 
entitled to recover or receive for or in respect of the injury, 
death or damage;
(2) that the application is not made by or on behalf of an 
insurer, or in lieu of a claim against an insurer, and no amount 
will be paid to reimburse an insurer.14
T h e solicitor for the person must make an affidavit
(1) that the judgment is a judgment as described in section 
287;
(2) giving particulars of the amount of damages for or in 
respect of injury or death, damage to property and the costs 
included in the judgment;
(3) that in so far as he was advised by any person and learned 
of any facts during the litigation,
(a) he has commenced action against all persons against 
whom the person might reasonably be considered as having 
a cause of action for or in respect of the injury, death or 
damage to person or property as described in clause (1) above 
of the applicant’s affidavit,
(b) the application is not made by or on behalf of an 
insurer, or in lieu of a claim against an insurer and no 
amount will be paid to reimburse an insurer, and
(c) except as disclosed in the applicant’s affidavit, the 
person is not entitled to recover from any source, nor to 
receive compensation or services or benefits with a pecuniary 
value, for or in respect of any injury, death or damage to 
person or property as described in clause (1) above or the 
applicant’s affidavit;
(4) that he has filed with the Registrar of M otor Vehicles a 
ccrtificatc of judgment and affidavit of non-satisfaction pur­
suant to section 2^9;
(5) that the action was defended throughout to judgment or 
that there was a default or a consent or agreement by or on 
behalf of the defendant and that he complied with section 
289.1"'
14. T h e  M otor Vehicle Act 1955, s. 287A (1), (2), as enacted by (1958) 
7 l.liz. II. c. 19, s. 17. T h is  requirem ent is almost identical with the 
form er s. 288 (I) (c).
I."*. T h e  M otor Vehicle Act 1955. s. 2 8 7 A (l)(b ) , as enacted by (1958)
7 F.liz. II, c. 19. s. 17.
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Under section 289, written notice must be given to the M inister 
if the defendant fails to file an appearance or a statement of 
defence, fails to appear in person or by counsel at the trial, or 
consents or agrees to the entering of judgment.
T h e  two affidavits, together with a cony of the statement of 
claim, a certified copy of the judgment docket and the assign­
ment of judgment, are forwarded to the Solicitor for the Unsat­
isfied Judgment Fund. If the amount of the judgment and costs 
is then paid by the M inister, he may also pay to the person for 
costs of the application the sum of twenty-five dollars.M!
For any of the reasons enumerated in the new section 287B, 
the M inister may delay payment and forthwith advise the person 
of his objections. Then if such objections are not remedied to 
his satisfaction, the Minister may advise the person that he must 
obtain an order of a Judge of the Supreme Court to obtain pay­
ment out of the Fund. If the person is so advised, he may, 011 
notifying the Minister, apply to a judge by way of summons for 
an order directing payment out of the F u n d .'7
It will be noted that when applying to the M inister for pay­
ment out of the Fund, it is not a requisite for payment that the 
applicant show that “he has taken all reasonable steps available 
to him to recover upon every judgment so obtained, stating the 
specific steps so taken” as was formerly the case.18 Since this prov­
ision has been repealed, it would appear that it is no longer 
necessary for the judgment creditor to avail himself of the var­
ious means by which he might attempt to realize upon his judg­
ment, including issuing execution, examining the defendant as a 
judgment debtor and making exhaustive inquiries to determine 
whether the defendant has any exigible assets. T h e  necessity for 
taking all reasonable steps to recover on the judgment has been 
the source of considerable litigation reflected in reported decis­
ions in other provinces. In view of this amendment, it might 
well be questioned whether the New Brunswick Unsatisfied Judg­
ment Fund remains “a sort of last resort” in the sense in whicn 
this phrase was used by M cRuer, C .J.I1 .C . in thc T e lfe r  case.1' 
bearing in mind that a judgment debtor can have his driver’s 
licence or owner s permit reinstated bv making satisfactory instal­
m ent payments 011 the judgment anti interest to the M inister.20
I<*. The M otor Vehicle Act 1 ?>.*>•». s. ÜK7 A ( I) (c). as enac ted by (1958) 
7 F.liz. II, c. 19. s. 17.
17. I he M otor Vehicle \ct 1955. ss. 287B. 287C. as enacted by (19">8) 
7 Eliz. 11, c. 19, s. 17.
18 T h e  M otor Vehicle Act 19.');». 4 Fliz. II. c. IS. s. 288 ( I) (b) (iii). repealed 
by (1958) 7 F.liz. II, c. 19, s. 18.
19. [1949] 2 D .I..R . (>27.
*20. I he M otor V eh icle  \<t 1955, s. 303A. as m a i le d  b\ < I*>.■»7) <» F.liz. I I ,
« . 21, s. 31.
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In this regard much, of course, will depend upon the attitude 
and policy of those charged with the administration of the Fund 
— more so than ever before. It would' certainly appear that any 
determination of the defendant’s ability to satisrv a judgment 
against him has become primarily the responsibility of the M in­
ister, although the statute is silent on the scope of his responsib­
ility in this regard.
If application is required to be made to a Judge of the 
Supreme C ourt to obtain payment out of the Fund, the appli­
cant must satisfy the judge that he has met the requirements 
set out in section 288, as amended in 1958. T h e M inister may 
appear and be heard on the application and may show cause 
why the order should not be made.21
Limits to Payment out of the Fund.
There are certain limits, monetary and otherwise, to payment 
out of the Fund. For example, section 299(1 )(a) provides that no 
amount for interest on a judgment or interest on costs may be 
paid out of the Fund. Section 299(1) (b) states that there may not 
dc paid out of the Fund
an\ amount in respect of a judgment in favour of a person 
who ordinarily resides outside of New Brunswick, unless such 
person resides in a jurisdiction which provides substantially 
the same benefits to persons who ordinarily reside in New 
Itrunswick:
T h e meaning of “ordinarily resides” has been considered in two 
Ontario decisions. In Service Fire Insurance Co. of New York v. 
Eggens'2- it was argued that the plaintiff was precluded from 
recovering from the Ontario Unsatisfied Judgment Fund because 
it ordinarily resided outside of Ontario, the plaintiff being a com- 
pany with its head office in the State of New York. Gale, J. in 
an oral judgment, held that the plaintiff did not “ordinarily 
reside out o f  O ntario” as that expression is used in section 98(5b) 
of the Highway Traffic A ct.23 In the course of his judgment the 
learned judge said:
. . . my main task is to ascertain, if I can. the purpose and 
scope <A the subsection in question. T h at being so. I am per­
suaded that ii wa% intended to exclude from the benefits be­
stowed by Part \ IV  of the Act only those persons who have 
in no wav contributed to the creation and m aintenance of th*
Fund from which those benefits are obtained. For exam ple,
21. T he M otor Vehicle Act 1933, s. 288, as amended by (1938) 7 Eliz. II,
c. 19. s. 18.
22. [1955] 4 D .I..R . 388.
23. R .S.O ., 1930, c. 16, s. 98 (3b), as enacted bv (1933) I F.liz. II , c. 46. 
s. 20(4).
the Act would not he available to a pi t son who simply comes 
to this Province temporarily 011 holidays, or to a company 
which does not tarry 011 business in this Province but merely 
has vehicles within its confines on occasions, even for business 
purposes.
On the other hand, I am of the opinion the new subsection 
was not meant to exclude from the advantages «if the Act 
companies such as the applicant and other sim ilar organiza­
tions which regularly can y  011 business in O ntario and contri­
bute to the welfare of this Province.-*
In a recent ease, Master 0. Kummu,-' the plaintiff at the 
time of the accident giving rise to the proceedings was living in 
Sudbury. l ie  was at the time a student at M cG ill University and 
during his attendance there he resided with his parents in M ont­
real. During his vacation he was engaged1 in summer employment 
in Sudbury, Ontario. Counsel for the M inister referred to the 
above-quoted statem ent of Gale, J. in the Service Fire Insurance 
case that . . it was intended to exclude from the benefits be­
stowed by Part X IV  of the Act only those persons who have in 110 
way contributed to the creation and maintenance of the Fund 
from which those benefits are obtained” . W ells, J. was of opinion 
that this statement did not truly reflect the judgment of Gale, J. 
but that “the persons meant to be excluded were those whose 
ordinary residence was outside of Ontario in the sense that they 
were not in Ontario for any permanent period but were as it 
were, transients or casual visitors”.-“ He therefore held that the 
plaintiff had an ordinary residence in Ontario as well as in Quebec 
and thus was not ordinarily resident outside Ontario at the per­
tinent time.
In both the Service Fire Insurance case and the Mester case 
the plaintiff had a residence in a jurisdiction which did not 
provide a recourse of a substantially similar character to that 
provided by the Ontario Unsatisfied Judgment Fund. In each 
case, therefore, the Minister attempted to show that the plaintiff 
was ordinarily resident outside Ontario.
T h e  necessary degree of similarity of legislation to enable a 
person resident in another jurisdiction to recover has been con­
sidered by the courts on several occasions, but a clear picture can­
not be drawn from the reported decisions. A resident of Mass­
achusetts cannot obtain payment out of the Ontario or Nova 
Scotia Unsatisfied Judgment Funds since it was shown in Beane 
v. Mil*7 and Sampson et al v. M a c K e n z i e respectively, that the
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24. [ I<».">.■»] 4 1 ) 1 .R . 388, at pp. 389-390.
25. ( 1958) II 1 ) 1 .R . (2d) 217.
26. Ibid .. at p. 223.
27. ( 1957) 7 D .L .R . (2d) 135.
2S (1957) 7 D I R . (2d) 461.
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scheme of compulsory insurance existing in that state does not 
provide a recourse of a substantially similar character. It would 
appear that the same would hold true in this province, although 
our statute differs slightly from those of Ontario and Nova Scotia. 
The New Brunswick statute speaks of other jurisdictions provid­
ing “substantially the same benefits” to New Brunswick residents, 
while the phrase “recourse of a substantially similar character” is 
used in Ontario and Nova Scotia.-1'
An application bv a Prince Edward Island resident for pay­
ment out of the Nova Scotia Unsatisfied Judgment Fund was 
granted in MacKinnon v. White™  even though the P .E .I. statute 
did not adopt the test of reciprocal treatment. T h e  P .E .I. 
statute31 docs permit recovery by a non-resident creditor against 
a P .E .I. judgment debtor but not, for example, recovery by a Nova 
Scotia judgment creditor against a New Brunswick judgment 
debtor for damages sustained in P .E .I. Nevertheless Doull. J. 
held, with the rest of the Court concurring, that the P .E .I. legis­
lation “is of a substantially similar character. It  is of the same 
kind and for the same purpose and in the main, it is administer­
ed on like principles’'.3*"
Section 299(1) further states that there may not be paid out 
of the Fund
(c) (i) more than Five Thousand Dollars, exclusive of costs, f.»t 
in ju x  to or the death of one person, and. subject to such lim it 
for anx one person so injured or killed, more than T en  
I housand Dollars, exclusixe > f costs, for injury to or the death 
of two or m oie persons in anx one accident; or
(ii) more than One Thousand Dollars, exclusive of costs, 
for damage to property resulting from any one accident;
T h e words “any one accident” have been judicially interpreted in 
several cases. In Hopkins v. White™  a car struck three small chil­
dren one after the other while being driven recklessly along a 
street. Urquhart J. of the Ontario High Court held that there 
was only one accident and hence the maximum recovery out of 
the Fund (exclusive of costs) was $10,000.00. I t  was immaterial 
that three separate actions had been brought and separately pur­
sued to judgment. T h e  word “accident” does not refer to an in­
dividual injury but rather to an occurrence, incident or event that
29. Cf. T h e  Motor Vehicle Wt. I Fli/. II. c. 13. s. 2 9 9 ( l) (b )  with R.S.O.. 
I9">0, c. w>7. s. W fib ), as enacted bx (19.'>3) I Fliz. II. c. 4<*. s. ‘2 d (I) 
and R.S.N .B.. I9M . c. 181. s. 179(H ).
St). (19.r>6) r> D .L .R . (2d) 76<¡.
31. R .S .P .E .I.. 19.11. c. 73, s. 115(1).
32. (I9*»r>) r> D .L.R. (2d) 7fi(». at p. 7<>9
S.T [19**0] 4 D .L .R . i>79.
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may result in injury to several individuals. In the words of 
Urquhart. J.:
I have ».> doubt that the Legislature had in its m ind’s eye an\ 
at(id ent (so tailed) in which a num ber o f persons might be 
killed or injured by one act of negligence. In fact the conclud­
ing words of section 93b (">) (a) in themselves show that in 'cn - 
tion: “on account of injury to or the death of two or more 
persons in any one accident”. If each individual in jury con­
stituted an accident, the words preceding the word "accident” 
woidd have little meaning; about the only occasion when one 
accident w. uld cover two or more persons injured would be 
when they were in the m otor car itself and practically every 
form of street accident would l)e excluded.*-*
Hopkins v. White was distinguished by Dunfield, J. of the 
Newfoundland Supreme C ourt in Re Carroll and Furlong™  
where three cars were struck in quick succession by a drunken 
driver, the collisions being spread over about 250 yards of street. 
T h e learned judge held tliat there were three distinct accidents, 
although it is difficult to see an adequate distinction between 
these facts and those in thc Hopkins case.
A broad interpretation was again placed on the phrase “one 
accident’’ by the Newfoundland Supreme Court in United Towns 
Electric Co. Ltd. v. Bishop™ where W alsh, C . J. held that there 
were two accidents in the following circumstances. W h ile  driv­
ing 011 the wrong side of the highway the defendant collided with 
a car driven by B who was proceeding in the opposite direction. 
After the impact with B ’s car, the defendant’s car swung to its 
right and into its proper lane and then back again onto the wrong 
side of the highway where it collided with the plaintiff’s car which 
was following behind B. B recovered judgment for $780.00 and 
was paid that amount out of the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund. 
T h e plaintiff also recovered judgment and applied for an order 
for payment of $905.00 out of the Fund. W alsh, C . J. was of 
opinion that “after the first collision, there was separate and dis­
tinct negligence 011 the part of the defendant in the operation and 
management of the car and that a new act of negligence caused 
the damage to the property of the plaintiff” .37 These three cases 
are especially interesting in that one would have expected the 
personal injuries in the Hopkins case to have prompted a decision 
favourable to the plaintiff rather than the property damage in the 
two Newfoundland decisions.
34. Ibid ., at pp. <i83-1.
3.*>. [I9.v>] 3 d . l . r .  279 .
3t>. [19*)’»] :> D .L .R . 782.
37 Ibid., at p. 78"».
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By scction 299(1 )(c)(i) rccovcry is limited to $5,000.00 for 
injury to or the death of one person. In Klebanoff v. Pric&{s the 
company plaintiff recovered $2,000.00 for loss of services of its 
president, who, also a plaintiff in the action, was awarded damages 
in the sum of $3,581.26, making a total of $5,581.26 awarded to 
both plaintiffs. T h e  Court directed an apportionment, holding 
that only $5,000.00 was available from the Fund. In Re Braili/ v. 
Fcrrill3” a woman received injuries in an automobile accident and 
recovered judgment for $5,392.60. Her husband was awarded 
damages in the sum of $1,231.00 for loss of consortium and other 
damages. Since his wife’s damages exceeded the $5,000.00 limit, 
the husband argued that not only were the wife’s injuries occas­
ioned by a motor vehicle but the damages he suffered, including 
loss of consortium, were also occasioned by a motor vehicle, and 
therefore there was injury to two persons and that part of the 
award to him for loss of consortium should not form part of the 
amount paid out on account of the wife’s injuries. T h e  court, in 
rejecting the argument, followed Klebanoff v. Price, and held 
that “ injury” was used in the sense of physical injury.
Section 299(1) was amended in 1958 by striking out the 
proviso thereto and substituting another40 which, I must admit, 
I find difficult to follow. T h e intention of the new proviso is 
fairly apparent, but a close reading of it discloses certain omissions 
and faults in draftsmanship. For example, it reads in part as 
follows:
. . . where he receives or is entitled i<> receive, from any 
source, compensation or services or Ix'nefiis with a pecuniary 
value for or in respect of the injury, death or damage . . . the 
pecuniary value of any services or benefits received or which 
he is entitled to receive . . .
shall be taken into consideration as therein set out in computing 
the amount payable from the Fund. It  will be observed in this 
excerpt that in one place mention is made of “compensation, or 
services or benefits” but further on only the words “services or 
benefits” are used. Under the present wording it could be argued 
that compensation with a pecuniary value need not be taken into 
consideration, since the operative part of the section states that 
“ the pecuniary value of any services or benefits” are to be con­
sidered, with the word “compensation” omitted at this point.
New Brunswick Decisions
A few comments should be made on the reported decisions 
on our Unsatisfied Judgment legislation. I have found only three
W. [1949) 2 1VI..R. 575.
39. [!9.r>4] 2 D .I..R . 253.
Hi. T he Motor Vehicle Act 195"», 4 F.liz. II. c. 13. s. 299(1). as amended by 
(1958) 7 F.liz. II, c. 19. s. 19.
such eases. In Saunders v. Smith" it was held that the plaintiff 
was entitled to the costs of the examination of the judgment 
debtor Under the Arrests and Examinations Act, since, under the 
Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, the costs allowable arc those taxed 
as between party and party and payable by the judgment debtor 
to the judgment creditor.
T h e two other cases involved the construction of the statute 
from the point of view of rctroactivitv. In Re Trites,*2 the Court 
of Appeal decided that a judgment creditor whose cause of action 
arose Defore February 1, 19->3, the date of proclamation of the 
Unsatisfied Judgment Fund provisions, has 110 right of recourse 
to the Fund, since the legislation is not retrospective; it is not 
sufficient that the judgment is obtained after that date. Similarly, 
in Provincial Secretarif-Treasurer v. Hastie et al,ri the Court of 
Appeal held that an amendment to the provisions of the Fund 
should not be given a retroactive effect.
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Conclusion
I11 common with most legislative schcmcs, bv usage the 
Fund has been found wanting. It is hoped that the latest amend­
ments will facilitate payment in deserving cases, while the Fund 
will not, at the same time, become accessible to a judgment 
creditor when reasonably thorough investigation would reveal 
that the judgment debtor has ample ability to pay. In other words, 
the Fund should not bccom c simply a convenient means of in­
stalment payment for solvent judgment debtors.
Perhaps consideration should' be given to raising the maxi­
mum amounts payable out of the Fund. My only comment here is 
this. In 1957 tne maximum amounts payable under the Ontario 
Unsatisfied Judgment Fund were raised (in the case of accidents 
occurring on or after January' 1, 1958) to $10,000.00, exclusive of 
costs, 011 account of injury to or the death of one person, and sub­
ject to such lim it for any one person so injured or killed, to 
$20,000.00, exclusive of costs, on account of injury to or the death 
of two or more persons in any one accident, and $2,000.00. 
exclusive of costs, for damage to property resulting from any one 
accident.44 T h e provisions for proof of financial responsibility 
were also amended by raising the minimum limts to $10,000.00,
41. (1954) 34 M .P .R . 138.
42. (1954) 34 M .P .R . 197.
43. (1953) 37 M .P.R. 21).
44. (1957) 5 & 0 Mi/. 1!. c. 14. ». 20 (2). (.3). am ending R.S.O.. 1905. i . 107. 
s. 98 (5) (a), (b).
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$20,000.00 and $5,000.00, respectively.45 It might well be asked 
whether, in view of this amendment to the Ontario statute, a 
New Brunswick resident suffering damage in Ontario could 
obtain payment out of the Ontario Fund. Does the New Bruns­
wick Unsatisfied Judgment Fund still provide a “recourse of a 
substantially similar character” despite the fact that an Ontario 
resident suffering damages in New Brunswick would be faced 
with limits of one-half tne amount existing in his own province? 
It was pointed out earlier that the reported cases do not reveal 
the precise degree of similaritv of legislation that must exist to 
permit recovery' by a non-resident. But surely, one of the most 
important provisions in an Unsatisfied Judgment Fund is that 
setting the maximum amounts recoverable. It would therefore 
appear questionable whether a New Brunswick resident suffering 
injury or damage in Ontario could successfully recoup his loss 
from the Ontario Fund, at least to the extent to which the 
Ontario maximum limits now exceed those existing in New 
Brunswick.
Problems of this nature will continue to arise when provinces 
attempt to insert reciprocal provisions in their statutes without 
any apparent regard for the provisions in other jurisdictions. Since 
wc are to a great extent a “generation on wheels”, closer co-opera- 
tion between the provinces with a view to secure uniform legisla­
tion would remove much of the doubt surrounding payment from 
an Unsatisfied Judgment Fund to a plaintiff who fives outside the 
jurisdiction where nis cause of action arises.
41. (1957) :» fc 6 Eli*. II. c. 44. s. 16(1). (2). amending R.S.O.. 1950. c. 167
s. 86.
